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NOTES AND COMMENTS




Civil Procedure-Use of Motion to Strike.
If appealed cases afford an accurate criterion, the statutory motion
to strike from pleadings is becoming much more prevalent in the North
Carolina courts. In the last completed volume of the North Carolina
Reports, there are five cases raising the point as compared to only
twenty-five in the previous sixteen volumes. The part of the statute
with which this note is concerned provides in effect that irrelevant or
redundant matter may be stricken out on the motion of the aggrieved
party, if made before answer or demurrer, or before extension of time
is granted in which to plead.'
In a recent suit against a railroad and its employee for negligent
injuries from the use of firearms in the hands of the employee, the trial
court, on defendant's motion, struck from the amended complaint alle-
gations that the individual defendant was possessed of a nervous and
irritable disposition, and of a violent and ungovernable temper. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed the trial court only as to the ner-
vous disposition, saying "Irritability and violent and ungovernable tem-
per could hardly be a contributing factor to negligence, while nervous-
ness may readily be a concomitant part thereof, and the retaining of a
person equipped with firearms with which to guard the railway station
of which he was in charge, when such person was known to possess a
nervous disposition, might constitute negligence on the part of the rail-
way company."2 In passing it may be said that such a distinction is
rather difficult to comprehend. The reverse appears nearer the truth.
The principal case lays down a general rule that seems quite popular
with the court: "On a motion to strike out, the test of relevancy of a
pleading is the right of the pleader to present the facts to which the
allegation relates in the evidence upon the trial."3 The difficulty of this
rule is in its application. There is no apparent reconcilable or pre-
" Note, Res Judicata in Administrative Law (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1250. Also
see Culp, Administrative Remedies In the Assessment and Enforcement of State
Taxes (1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 118, in which a hands-off policy is suggested to
the courts insofar as upsetting expert administrative determinations as to tax
liability, thereby relying more heavily on the bodies' expertness.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §537.
'Whitlow v. Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. (2d) 809 (1940).
' Pemberton v. Greensboro, 203 N. C. 514, 166 S. E. 396 (1932) ; Patterson v.
Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938) ; Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop,
214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938) ; Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214
N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938); Wadesboro v. Coxe, 215 N. C. 708, 2 S. E.
(2d) 876 (1939); Sayles, Adm'x v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. (2d) 393
(1940).
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dictable consistency in the decisions. On occasion the court will go into
a lengthy discussion of the merits of the particular pleading being at-
tacked by the motion. If the conclusion is that it constitutes part of the
pleader's cause of action or defense, it will remain because evidence to
support it may be presented at the trial ;4 otherwise it will be stricken.5
In other cases the court has announced. itself in opposition to a policy of
"charting the course of the trial in advance", and therefore has refused
to sustain a motion to strike without considering the question of the
relevancy of the attacked pleading. The protection afforded the moving
party where this procedure is followed lies in an objection to the evi-
dence when presented at the trial.6
Why this diametrically opposite treatment? The reason is probably
founded on very practical considerations. Where the court allows or
disallows the motion after a discussion of the merits of the case, it does
so because it is sure of the ground on whi6h it treads; that is, there is
no doubt in the court's mind that the particular pleading is relevant or
irrelevant to the suit at hand.7 Or else, in rare cases, the court might
feel that the pleading is so worded as to make a profound impression
when read. to an .easily prejudiced jury, which would be definitely
harmful to the moving party.8 On the other hand, where the court
refuses to "chart the course of the trial in advance", it would seem
that it is uncertain, at least at the early stage in which such motion
arises, whether or not the pleading will be proper.9 Consequently the
moving party is left to the adequate remedy of objecting to the evi-
dence, if and when it is offered.
"When made in apt time, it (motion to strike) is not addressed to
the court's discretion, but is made as a matter of right." This rule is
found in numerous decisions.' 0 As contrasted with "discretion", it
would seem that "matter of right" should mean that the moving party
has a right to have his motion decided on the merits, from which deci-
sion either party can appeal. This is true where the motion is allowed,
'Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756 (1936); Barron v. Cain, 216
N. C. 282, 4 S. E. (2d) 618 (1939).
'Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938);
Whitlow v. Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. (2d) 809 (1940) ; Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940); cf. Federal Reserve Bank v.
Atmore, 200 N. C. 437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931).
'Hardy v. Dahl, 209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936) ; Hildebrand v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 4 S. E. (2d) 439 (1939).
"Cf. Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918
(1938).
8Cf. Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938).
'Hardy v. Dahl, 209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936); cf. Hildebrand v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 4 S. E. (2d) 439 (1939).
"0 Federal Reserve Bank v. Atmore, 200 N. C. 437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931);
Poovey v. Hickory, 210 N. C. 630. 188 S. E. 78 (1936); Herndon v. Massey,
217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940); cf. Fayetteville v. Spur Distilling Co.,
216 N. C. 596, 5 S. E. (2d) 838 (1939).
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for the Superior Court judge has necessarily made a "merit" decision
in order to have determined that the contested pleading is irrelevant.
The injured party may then except and immediately appeal. There is
no justifiable escape from this, for he may be entitled to have his lost
pleading remain and it would be most unfair to force him, against his
will, to go to the expense of continuing the trial to its end before he
is allowed to raise the point. For if he lost and then established his
right to material pleadings, the trial would have- been in vain. When
deciding such an appeal, the Supreme Court may determine the merits
of the case, 1 or refuse to chart the course of the trial in advance.
12
Either method, under these circumstances, will adequately protect the
injured party.
The problem, as it relates to appeals, is more difficult of solution
where the motion to strike is denied and the contested pleading remains.
In this situation, what is the meaning of the court's statement that the
motion is made as a "matter of right"? It seems to mean that the court
will either determine whether or not the pleading is relevant, 13 or will
refuse to chart the course of the trial in advance. 14 When this "chart"
rule is used, the only effect is to decide the motion itself by merely
postponing a decision as to the relevancy of the particular pleading.
The use of this rule appears to rest entirely in the Supreme Court, in
view of its policy of hearing immediate appeals. There is nothing to
indicate that any leeway has been given the Superior Court judge in
his invocation of this rule. He apparently is as liable to be reversed
when he invokes it as when he decides the motion on the merits.
Assuming that the North Carolina Court is going to continue its
use of the "chart" rule, it should grant the Superior Court judge wide
discretion in applying it, and allow no appeal from his ruling. Aware-
ness of the possibilities of such a procedure may have caused the re-
cently expressed doubt of the Supreme Court concerning the right of
immediate appeal where the motion is denied. 15 Overwhelming factors
argue against such an appeal. Although C. S. 638 allows an appeal
from every judicial order affecting a substantial right, such right is
I1 Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364 (1938) ; Whitlow v.
Southern Ry., 217 N. C. 558, 8 S. E. (2d) 809 (1940) ; cf. Federal Reserve Bank
v. Atnore, 200 N. C. 437, 157 S. E. 129 (1931).
"2Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 N. C. 235, 4 S. E. (2d)
439 (1939).
"' Duke v. Crippled Childrens' Hospital, 214 N. C. 570, 199 S. E. 918 (1938);
Barron v. Cain, 216 N. C. 282, 4 S. E. (2d) 618 (1939); Sayles, Adm'x v.
Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. (2d) 393 (1940).
", Pemberton v. Greensboro, 205 N. C. 599, 172 S. E. 196 (1934) ; Hardy v.
Dahl, 209 N. C. 746, 184 S. E. 480 (1936); cf. Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop,
214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. (2d) 645 (1938).
"Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938); cf.
Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756 (1936).
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sufficiently protected by allowing the moving party to object to the evi-
dence. The infrequent argument that the reading of the pleadings to
the jury will prejudice them seems, in actuality, rather negligible, for
juries apparently pay little attention to the pleadings when presented.16
Also it is possible that evidence may not be presented to support such
allegations. In view of the safeguards to the moving party, it seems
rather unfair to leave the other party without any choice but to submit
to the expense of defending such an unnecessary appeal. Since it is
apparent that the use of the motion to strike is becoming more fre-
quent, and since, as it stands now, the discretion as to charting or not
charting the course of the trial is in the Supreme Court, thus neces-
sitating their consideration of such appeals, their work will be burdened
with deciding an increasing number of questions which are of no ma-
terial benefit. To refuse appeal in this situation would obviously rem-
edy these problems, and would put the discretion in the Superior Court
judge where it rightfully belongs.
The "law of the case" is that a court, having ruled on a certain ques-
tion, will not again hear the case upon the same point.17 To what
extent does this pertain to motions to strike? On appeals, if the motion
is allowed, evidence to support the stricken allegations cannot be ad-
mitted, as the court has ruled on the merits that the particular pleading
is improper. However, this should not bar such evidence for a sec-
ondary purpose, such as impeachment of an adverse witness, for here
there would be no attempt to introduce it in support of the wrongful
allegations. On the other hand, where the court denies the motion on
its merits, it seems that the trial judge would be bound to allow the
evidence to come in. Where the "chart" rule is invoked, nothing has
been decided. Consequently the moving party must prepare to efend,
in view of a possible adverse ruling by the trial judge on his objection
to the evidence.
Often a party who has suffered an adverse ruling on a motion to
strike may feel that an immediate appeal is unnecessary or undesirable.
How should he protect himself so that he may have the privilege of
contesting the ruling in case he should lose his case and appeal? If
the Superior Court judge allows the motion the injured party must
except. Logically, an offer of the evidence at the trial should be un-
necessary, for in allowing the motion, the judge has, in effect, ruled
that he will not admit the evidence, and consequently any offer of it
would be useless. However, a careful attorney, to show that he is
still relying on his exception and to prevent any question of his having
"8 Cf. Poovey v. Hickory, 210 N. C. 630, 188 S. E. 78 (1936); Warren v.
Virginia Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 214 N. C. 206, 198 S. E. 624 (1938).17
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §28.
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waived his right to do so, should make some offer of the evidence that
he would like to prove under the stricken pleadings. Where the motion
is denied, the moving party's only remedy is to object to the evidence
when presented. If it is denied on the merits, the Superior Court
judge has made his decision to allow the evidence to come in. In this
situation the moving party should except to the denial and then object
to the evidence. If he does not except to the denial he may be con-
sidered to have waived his right to object to the evidence by acquiescing
in it; while if he fails to object to the evidence, he may, on appeal, be
considered to have waived his right to his exception to the denial. If
the judge denies the motion by invoking the "chart" rule, he is simply
deferring a decision on the question until the evidence is offered. Thus
it seems that the moving party would not have to except in order to
object to the evidence. However, in many instances the judge may give
no reason for his denial, and exception should be taken in all such cases
to prevent any subsequent contention that the judge's ruling was on
the merits.
In the interest of simplicity, and in order to clarify the difficult,
and in many cases unnecessary problems that develop from the use of
the motion to strike, it seems that it would be advantageous from both
the point of view of the court and of the parties litigant, for the court
to lay down the following set rule on motions to strike made in apt
time: (1) Where allowed, the aggrieved party may (a) except and
appeal immediately, and obtain a decision as to whether or not he may
support the contested allegations by evidence at the trial, or (b) except
to the ruling and be allowed to raise the question if the case is subse-
quently appealed, provided, at least, that he has preserved his exception
by offering the evidence at the trial. (2) Where denied, he may not
appeal, but must seek his relief by excepting to the ruling and objecting
to the evidence when and if it is offered.
J. B. CHESHIRE, IV.
Contracts-Effect of Second Contract With Defaulter Upon
Rights for Breach of First.
An elementary rule of contract law is that a party injured by a
breach of contract has a "duty"' to mitigate any damages suffered
'Strictly speaking the "duty" to mitigate damages is not a duty at all, not
an affirmative obligation. The rule merely sets up a standard for ascertain-
ment of damages, recognizing a disability in the injured party to collect avoidable
damages. RaSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §336, comment (d); 5 WILILISTON,
CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1937) 3795, 3813. In the interests of.brevity the word
"duty" is used throughout this note as qualified by this footnote.
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